Privacy keeps what you do from others; anonymity keeps who you are from them. This guide is about the second: reading, searching and publishing without the site, or anyone watching your connection, learning who and where you are. Tor Project says perfect anonymity is generally impossible, even with Tor. Using Tor is also visible to your internet provider by default, and can draw attention. Weigh that before you start: see Weigh what protection costs.
Tor sends your connection through at least three servers, called relays, so that no single point knows both who you are and what you are doing.
- Without Tor, your internet provider can see every site you visit, and every site sees your IP address, which shows roughly where you are.
- With Tor, your internet provider sees only that you connect to Tor, and the site sees only that someone connects from Tor.
- The last relay can see your traffic but not who sent it. If the site uses HTTPS, it sees only which site you are visiting.
- A VPN is different: one company knows both who you are and what you browse. See Know what a VPN can't do.
- A private or Incognito window doesn't make you anonymous: see Know what a private window doesn't hide.
Tor Project says Tor doesn't protect you from someone who can watch both your connection and the site you visit at the same time and match the timing. Sites can tell you use Tor, because the list of Tor relays is public.
Tor Browser protects only what you do inside it. Other browsers and apps on the same device still use your normal connection.
Tor hides your IP address. It can't hide what you tell a site yourself.
- If you sign in to a personal account or enter your name, email, phone number or address, that site knows who you are. Banks and email providers may also lock the account, Tor Project warns.
- Don't use two identities in the same session: sites can link accounts that use the same Tor connection. Use New Identity in between, or restart Tails.
- Use a separate username, email address and phone number for an anonymous identity, and don't reuse them elsewhere. Privacy Guides notes that writing style and what you know can also link a pseudonym to you, and Security in a Box suggests posting from different identities at different times of day.
- When Tor Browser warns you before opening a downloaded file in another app, take the warning seriously. Tor Project says Word and PDF files can load content from the internet outside Tor and reveal your real IP address. Tor Browser's own PDF viewer is the exception. Open other files on a computer that is offline, or convert them first with a tool such as Dangerzone.
- Remove metadata before you upload photos or documents: see Remove hidden data from files.
- Don't use torrent apps over Tor. Tor Project says most of them reveal your real IP address.
- Watch for people or cameras that can see your screen.
None of these steps hide you from someone who already has access to your device. See Spyware aimed at you.
A VPN hides your IP address from sites, but the VPN company sees your traffic. EFF says a VPN "is not a tool for anonymity" and that Tor is the better choice for it. See Know what a VPN does and doesn't do.
- A VPN doesn't stop tracking by cookies, fingerprinting, GPS or accounts you sign in to.
- Tor Project doesn't recommend combining a VPN with Tor unless you are an advanced user, because a wrong set-up can weaken Tor's protection. Privacy Guides disagrees and says connecting to a trusted VPN first is worth it for many people. It strongly warns against connecting through Tor first and then a VPN.
- Tor Project's new Tor VPN app for Android is a beta. Tor Project says to use it only for testing, because it may leak information.
A VPN company's promise not to keep logs is not a guarantee, EFF says.
Bridges are Tor relays that aren't on the public list. They help you connect where Tor is blocked. They may slow down your connection.
Phones are harder to keep anonymous. The mobile network sees your SIM card and your phone together, and apps on the phone can identify you.
Tails is a system you start from a USB stick instead of Windows or macOS. It sends everything through Tor and forgets everything when you shut it down.
- You need a USB stick of at least 8 GB and a computer, not a phone or tablet. Follow the steps and the download check on tails.net/install, and install it from a computer you trust.
- Tails can keep files in an encrypted Persistent Storage on the stick. Tails warns it is not hidden: anyone with the stick can see it exists, and you could be forced or tricked into giving its passphrase.
- Restart Tails between different activities, so that sites can't link them.
Tails can't protect you on a computer with a hardware keylogger or tampered firmware, Tails says. Your internet provider can see that you connect to Tor unless you choose to hide it and use a bridge, and when Tails connects automatically it can show that you use Tails.
- In Tor Browser, open check.torproject.org. It tells you whether your connection goes through Tor.
- Open our What your browser reveals tool in Tor Browser and in your usual browser, and compare. It needs JavaScript, so it won't run at Safest; don't lower your level just for it. Tor Browser tries to make all its users look the same: Tor Project says, for example, that every Windows computer appears as Windows 10.
- To see which relays a tab uses, open the site information menu in the address bar.
A check shows what one page can see at that moment. It can't show what you have revealed through accounts, files or habits.
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